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IndonesIA’s role In reAlIzInG The GoAls of 
AseAn’s AGreemenT on TrAnsBoundAry hAze 
PolluTIon
By David B. Jerger, Jr.*
I. InTroducTIon
During monsoon season, from May to September, the Southeast Asian mainland and Borneo face the pros-pect of haze arriving from the Indonesian archipelago.1 
This haze primarily consists of the dissipated smoke from fires 
on the Indonesian island of Sumatra.2 Human activity creates the 
haze when individuals and companies cut down trees and burn 
peatlands3 to clear the land for small-scale agricultural purposes 
or for industrial purposes, such as palm oil plantations and log-
ging.4 Because of monsoon wind patterns and Sumatra’s geo-
graphical proximity to peninsular Malaysia and Singapore, these 
two countries are especially susceptible to haze.
Haze can hang over Malaysia and Singapore for weeks 
and even months.5 The inhabitants and governments normally 
have no recourse but to wait for storms that may shift the haze 
elsewhere.6 It is difficult to predict where and when the haze 
will arrive, how long it will remain, and how thick it will be.7 
These variables depend on the number of “hotspots”––burning 
activities resulting in haze––each year. 8 Moreover, air pollution 
is complex and therefore hard to regulate effectively. Even when 
pollution originates from domestic sources providing govern-
ments with jurisdiction over regulation, creating a regulatory 
regime is still problematic.9 Regulation becomes even more 
problematic when the pollution source lies beyond the affected 
country’s borders. The main reasons transboundary pollution10 
is so difficult to regulate are threefold: (1) there is generally no 
political will to impose costs domestically when the effects of 
pollution are felt abroad; (2) the polluted country faces jurisdic-
tional hurdles when bringing a suit against the polluter country; 
and (3) judgments can often be difficult to enforce.11
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (“ASEAN”) 
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (“Agreement”), 
which entered into force in 2003, attempts to create a framework 
that will allow parties to reduce transboundary pollution and 
the associated harm.12 However, Indonesia, the region’s greatest 
source of transboundary air pollution, has not ratified the treaty.13 
Indonesia has repeatedly promised to ratify the Agreement, but 
its legislature has refused to act without guarantees from other 
ASEAN states that they will not buy timber illegally imported 
from Indonesia.14
This article argues that Indonesia should ratify the 
Agreement because it creates an effective framework for reduc-
ing transboundary haze pollution without placing new bur-
dens on Indonesia. As a framework treaty, the purpose of the 
Agreement is to gather information on the causes of transbound-
ary haze pollution and the actions member-states are taking to 
mitigate it. This information will lead to a more complete under-
standing of what actions parties should take to reduce pollution 
and how those actions affect pollution. As a result, parties will 
adjust their behavior over time, leading to greater mitigation. The 
Agreement makes this information compiling and sharing pos-
sible by omitting sanctions or binding adversarial proceedings 
from its provisions, which incentivizes a collaborative approach 
toward addressing the pollution and gives member-states less of 
a reason to report false or inaccurate data.
This article begins by discussing the origin of transbound-
ary haze pollution in Southeast Asia, moves to the background 
to and structure of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary 
Haze Pollution, and finally argues that Indonesia should ratify 
the Agreement.
II. causes oF Transboundary aIr PolluTIon  
In souTheasT asIa
Haze describes the amount of particulate matter in the air 
and its effect on visibility.15 Particulate matter usually enters the 
air as a result of smoke from fires and gathers when humidity is 
low.16 Air is considered “hazy” when ground level visibility is 
between 1000 and 2000 meters.17 In windless conditions haze 
tends to remain in one location, creating adverse health effects 
including reduced lung capacity in the young, cardiovascular 
problems, and reduced life expectancy.18 People living in areas 
affected by haze may deal with it for weeks or months at a time, 
breathing in smoke particulates until a storm system powerful 
enough to move or dissipate the dense, “hazy” air passes through 
the affected area.
Because storms and wind patterns affect the haze’s location, 
haze from one source can travel great distances, even across 
national borders, when strong wind patterns prevail.19 Haze 
pollution becomes transboundary pollution when it travels from 
the state in which it originated (“source state”) across national 
borders to the “affected state.”20 Transboundary pollution is an 
especially challenging issue in international environmental law 
because it is difficult to figure out how transboundary pollu-
tion works and because the benefit of the activity causing the 
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pollution in the source state outweighs the cost of the pollution 
there. 21
Transboundary pollution is complicated because it is often 
difficult to understand what factors are causing the problem 
and how these factors affect each other.22 Scientists and poli-
cymakers must determine where pollutants originate and how 
the pollutants interact with large systems such as global air-flow 
patterns, which is a highly technical endeavor.23 The science that 
deals with these problems is also often being examined for the 
first time.24 This introduces a degree of uncertainty to explana-
tions of how the pollution occurs and predictions about where it 
will occur next.25
Although transboundary pollution primarily harms affected 
states, source states often experience some harm as well.26 But 
source states also enjoy the benefits of the activities that cause 
the transboundary pollution. The existence of such pollution 
suggests that the source state has determined the benefits of the 
polluting activity outweigh the cost of regulating the pollution.27 
This imbalance makes it unlikely a source state would agree to 
a treaty that penalizes the creation of transboundary pollution. 
However, the categories of source state and affected state are not 
mutually exclusive; in fact, it is common that a state is both a 
source state and an affected state.28 In the case of air pollution, a 
state can change from a source state to an affected state as easily 
as the wind changes direction.29
A. Indonesian Fires
Fires in Indonesia are widely considered the largest contrib-
uting factor to Southeast Asia’s regional haze.30 The haze that 
originates in Indonesia is so massive that it has reached beyond 
peninsular Malaysia to Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos on the 
Asian mainland, and Brunei and the Malaysian states on the 
island of Borneo.31 This haze results from fires in Indonesia and 
the Indonesian government’s inabil-
ity to prevent or control them.32
Indonesia’s fires are largely a 
result of its agricultural industry. 
Indonesia has ideal growing condi-
tions for palm trees which produce 
palm oil, a major cash crop,33 and 
is also home to valuable tropical 
timber.34 About sixty percent of 
Indonesia’s territory is forest land35 
and twenty-two million hect-
ares—half the size of Sweden—are 
peatlands.36 In recent years, many 
peatlands have been drained to make 
palm oil and forest plantations.37 
Drained peatlands are more likely 
to catch fire, and these fires can 
continue burning underground even 
after they have been extinguished on 
the surface.38 Although some fires occur as a result of “light-
ning strikes on parched, peat-rich lands,” 39 there is widespread 
agreement that the bulk of Indonesia’s fires are the result of the 
slash-and-burn agriculture employed by the palm oil plantations 
and logging industries.40
Slash-and-burn agriculture, which relies on fire to clear oth-
erwise seemingly indestructible vegetation, is a traditional prac-
tice for clearing land in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia.41 
Plantation owners and farmers alike prefer the slash-and-burn 
technique because it is cheap, easy, and effective—just light 
a match and control the burn.42 The indiscriminate use of this 
method, however, destroys the vegetation that covers peatlands, 
leaving them exposed and vulnerable to fire.43
Although small-scale farmers do cause fires, their impact 
is minimal compared to the impact of logging companies and 
plantations.44 Plantation owners use slash-and-burn to convert 
logged areas into plantations for palm oil and other cash crops 
and for timber and pulp production areas.45 The large-scale 
nature of plantations and logging means that these two activities 
contribute the most to creating the conditions that lead to wide-
spread and uncontrollable fires.46 The plantations and timber 
industry have been able to perform slash-and-burn agriculture 
on such a large scale in part because they have been effective in 
influencing Indonesian land-use and forest policies to maximize 
their own short-term gains.47
The Indonesian government did ban using fire to clear land 
in 1995, but this ban has not been effectively enforced due to 
Indonesia’s relative poverty and the fact that slash-and-burn 
agriculture is a traditional land-clearing technique believed to 
create more fertile land.48 The end result is that haze from fires 
in Indonesia travels across national borders to Malaysia and 
Singapore, creating an international issue.
B. Indonesia’s Failure to Control Fires
In addition to political influence, Indonesia’s size and geog-
raphy make it difficult for the government to adequately prevent 
these fires.49 Indonesia is the largest 
archipelagic state in the world, con-
sisting of 17,508 islands, 6,000 of 
which are inhabited.50 Roughly three 
times as large as Texas, its territory 
straddles the Equator and stretches 
from the Indian to the Pacif ic 
Ocean.51 Indonesia’s geography as 
a sprawling archipelago coupled 
with its lack of infrastructure leads 
to delays in governmental response 
time to fires.52
Peninsular Malaysia and 
Singapore are most affected by 
Indonesian haze because of their 
geographical proximity to the larger 
islands of the Indonesian archipelago 
and prevailing wind patterns.53 In the 
summer of 2012, Malaysia measured 
“unhealthy” air quality throughout the country from Kuala 
Lumpur, the capital and largest city, to Port Klang, Malaysia’s 
largest port.54 During this time, the Malaysian Meteorological 
“Drained peatlands 
are more likely to 
catch fire, and these 
fires can continue 
burning underground 
even after they have 
been extinguished on 
the surface.”
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Department also released reports on air quality and sources of 
haze, including satellite-identified sources across the Indonesian 
archipelago where “uncontrolled daily burning in Sabah, 
Sarawak, and Kalimantan” was taking place.55
III. reGulaTInG Transboundary aIr PolluTIon
Given the interstate nature of transboundary air pollution, 
it is regulated, if at all, by international environmental law. 
International environmental law is a field that has developed 
in the twentieth century through adjudications, soft law dec-
larations, and multilateral agreements. General principles of 
international law that have emerged include state sovereignty 
over natural resources,56 good neighborliness and international 
cooperation,57 sustainable development,58 the precautionary 
principle,59 the polluter pays principle,60 and common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility.61 The advantage of these principles 
is their clear explanation of a state’s rights and responsibilities 
with respect to another state’s environment. Their disadvantage 
is that they place a large burden on source states because they 
require the source state to act against its self-interest by modify-
ing activities from which it largely benefits simply because they 
harm another state. This burden makes it unlikely that source 
states would agree to treaties that rigidly adhere to these prin-
ciples or to recognize the jurisdiction of an international court or 
arbitration panel that would apply these principles.62
Recognizing these problems, an effective treaty for regulat-
ing transboundary pollution should not pit parties against one 
another, but rather create a framework that allows them to work 
toward a common goal.63 Such a treaty acknowledges that: (1) 
states can work collaboratively to regulate transboundary pollu-
tion, even in the absence of coercive measures such as sanctions 
or arbitration; (2) international agreements evolve over time, as 
do the national implementing measures, so state cooperation 
in refining the treaty outweighs state compliance at any single 
time;64 and (3) while states are the primary actors, other actors 
including intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and private 
industrial and commercial organizations, also play an important 
role. 65
A. Problems of Regulating Transboundary Pollution
Transboundary pollution has proven especially difficult 
to regulate by way of international treaty for several reasons.66 
First, it is difficult to gain consent from source states over an 
issue with asymmetrical costs and benefits.67 This is true 
whether that consent takes the form of agreeing to adjudicative 
measures or ratifying a treaty. Second, even when source states 
have consented, affected states rarely invoke litigation under 
those principles.68 Consequently, affected states settle for mul-
tilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) that only weakly 
bind parties.69
Source states may be reluctant to agree to an arrangement 
that will upset the status quo because the source state receives 
most or all of the economic benefits of the economic activity 
that creates the pollution.70 The state has presumably decided 
that the cost associated with the pollution that stays within its 
borders is an acceptable tradeoff.71 Moreover, if the pollution 
results from a disaster, rather than economic activity, the source 
state would rather spend resources on disaster response than pay 
damages to another party. At the same time, the affected state 
obtains no benefit from the economic activities occurring in the 
source state.72 Rather, the affected state is forced to bear the cost 
of mitigating the transboundary pollution.73
Logically, the source state should bear the cost of its pollu-
tion, as is consistent with the polluter pays principle. The source 
state, however, is unlikely to consent to an arrangement that 
would evaluate its behavior based on these principles74 precisely 
because its behavior directly conflicts with them.75 Although the 
affected state will argue that it is fair to make the source state 
bear the costs of its pollution, it is difficult in practice to compel 
a source state to agree because of this imbalance of interests.76
Some scholars have suggested that measures such as litiga-
tion, arbitration, or sanctions are the most effective way to stop 
transboundary pollution.77 This argument is appealing because it 
relies on procedures that result in binding judgments for deter-
ring certain activities and enforcing domestic environmental 
regulation.78 But despite clear legal principles governing respon-
sibility for transboundary pollution and existing forums to pur-
sue such claims, affected states rarely invoke coercive measures 
in international disputes.79 For instance, the Trail Smelter case,80 
an arbitration that established the polluter pays principle in the 
international context, is arguably as famous for that legal prin-
ciple81 as it is for being an exception to the rule that adjudicatory 
measures are not invoked to resolve international environmental 
issues.82 Even the Chernobyl disaster did not result in litigation, 
despite radiation travelling to over twenty downwind states and 
millions of dollars of monetary losses.83
In order for coercive measures––the threat of sanctions or 
a binding judgment––to affect behavior, parties must closely 
monitor one another’s behavior and be willing to report and 
punish noncompliance. This is especially problematic in the 
environmental context because environmental problems involve 
complex systems, verifying compliance would require develop-
ing expensive monitoring methods and systems, and scientific 
uncertainty makes parties reluctant to agree on concrete targets 
for emissions or technology standards.84
Moreover, sanctions would not likely stop transboundary 
pollution and its causes.85 First, if it is important to the source 
state to continue activities that create the transboundary pollu-
tion, it will likely be willing to accept economic sanctions.86 The 
source state can divert resources to work around sanctions that 
it could have used to reduce transboundary pollution, as the pol-
luting activity continues unabated. Second, if the sanctions do 
change the source state’s behavior, it may also require a long 
period of time before the effects are significant enough to benefit 
the affected states.87
Further, sanctions impose costs on affected states: the 
affected states must expend resources to administer the sanc-
tions regime and must assemble and maintain a broad consensus 
among parties with respect to the necessity and legitimacy of 
those sanctions.88 Because of these costs, states do not enforce 
sanctions regularly or effectively.89 The irregular enforcement 
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that does occur may be more for domestic political reasons than 
an interest in reliable enforcement.90 Such enforcement then 
erodes the legitimacy of the sanctioning body because of the 
inconsistent enforcement outcomes.91
In the absence of litigation that results in coercive mea-
sures, international environmental law has turned to multilateral 
environmental agreements (“MEAs”) to regulate international 
environmental issues. Despite the ineffectiveness of existing 
coercive measures, MEAs have been criticized for both lacking 
such coercive measures and for consequently having low com-
pliance and weak targets.92 Some have even argued that MEAs 
are not meaningful law because they have no mechanism that 
will change a party’s behavior.93 Instead, these MEAs require a 
meeting of the parties for the purpose of “developing procedures 
for implementation and noncompliance within the framework of 
the agreement.”94
B. Using a Managerial Model to Regulate 
Transboundary Haze Pollution
Despite their seeming ineffectiveness, due at least in part to 
the lack of coercive measures,95 MEAs are not failures. Rather, 
they are aspirational96 and use a “managerial model” framework 
that allows compliance to increase over time.97 While they 
are not contracts that commit parties to take action to solve a 
problem,98 the managerial model allows the MEA to respond to 
changes in technology, scientific understanding, and politics.99 
These treaties no longer memorialize political settlements and 
arrangements; rather they provide a framework for countries to 
use to address complex and ongoing problems, like transbound-
ary pollution.100 In fact, MEAs that only weakly bind parties to 
meet loosely defined obligations and have weak or nonexistent 
penalties for failing to meet these obligations are an effective 
way to mitigate transboundary air pollution.101
1. coercIve meAsures do noT 
leAd To GreATer comPlIAnce
It is impractical and undesir-
able for an MEA to rely primarily 
on a coercive system to regulate 
transboundary pollution. Coercive 
systems alienate source states, which 
adversely impacts affected states 
because they have a compelling 
interest in keeping the source state at 
the table. If the transboundary pollu-
tion is problematic when the source 
state is party to the MEA, how much 
worse might it be if the source state 
was not?102 The answer to this ques-
tion reveals the paradox of regulating 
transboundary pollution: in some 
ways, the source state has greater 
bargaining power. Absent its participation, the MEA would 
almost certainly be ineffective in regulating the transbound-
ary pollution.103 In most cases, the source state is best able to 
monitor the pollution at its creation and early stages, and to take 
action to prevent it from becoming transboundary pollution. The 
source state is also the only state with authority to regulate the 
activities taking place within its borders and to sit in judgment 
when actors violate its laws.104
This is not to say that coercive measures have no place in 
MEAs. Coercive measures can set targets that have an action-
forcing effect even if parties never invoke them.105 However, 
coercive measures will have no effect if the source state is not 
already a party to the MEA. In fact, such provisions may per-
suade some source states to remain outside of the MEA.
2. The mAnAGerIAl model AlloWs comPlIAnce To 
IncreAse over TIme
When MEAs are thought of as frameworks, there is less 
emphasis on satisfying specific terms in the MEA at any single 
point in time.106 The emphasis shifts to the parties periodically 
reevaluating “the interpretation, elaboration, application, and, 
ultimately, enforcement of international rules” as new infor-
mation about the nature of transboundary pollution and state 
behavior becomes available.107 The managerial model uses 
certain techniques to make this more discursive approach work: 
increased transparency, coordination among the parties, data 
collection, and reliance on non-state actors.108 This approach 
especially makes sense for transboundary pollution where par-
ties view the issue as “a problem to be solved, rather than a claim 
to be settled or a wrong to be adjudicated.”109
Unlike the traditional model with its coercive measures, the 
managerial model fosters cooperation between parties.110 This 
cooperation allows parties to periodically review actions taken 
by parties to the agreement and non-parties.111 The managerial 
model relies on transparency, coordination, reporting, verifica-
tion, and monitoring to ensure that cooperation between the par-
ties leads to more effective solutions.112
To create transparency, an MEA 
must ensure parties have access to 
information on the activities each 
party is undertaking and that policies 
governing their activities exists.113 
After parties have evaluated the 
information, they can better deter-
mine what objectives to focus on. 
They can then decide what actions 
each party should take to meet 
those objectives, while taking into 
account what actions each party 
can take. This information lets par-
ties know whether other parties are 
following the MEA’s norms, rules, 
and procedures, and thus making a 
good faith effort to comply with the 
MEA, which can also lead to greater 
effectiveness.114
Transparency may also serve as a deterrent for parties that 
are considering noncompliance.115 If all parties are complying 
with their obligations under the MEA, it may motivate a wavering 
“[Parties] can then 
decide what actions 
each party should 
take to meet those 
objectives, while 
taking into account 
what actions each 
party can take.”
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party to make an effort to comply in order to avoid being an out-
lier. In addition, this information can be used to mold the MEA’s 
norms, rules, and procedures if parties are unable to comply, or 
compliance has not lead to greater effectiveness in mitigating 
transboundary pollution.116 In the managerial model, rather than 
blaming parties for noncompliance or ineffective action, the par-
ties modify the MEA to more effectively address the problem.
The managerial model also relies on parties coordinating 
with one another to mitigate transboundary pollution and oth-
erwise meet the MEA’s goals.117 These coordination efforts can 
take the form of notifying a party about pollution, setting up 
information exchanges, or simply requiring parties to take “all 
appropriate measures” in preventing and mitigating transbound-
ary pollution.118 In some cases, these measures are all that is 
needed to mitigate transboundary pollution.119 Coordination is 
especially important for addressing problems too complex for 
one party to solve on its own,120 and for reducing higher costs of 
coordinating on an ad hoc basis.121
One example of an MEA successfully addressing trans-
boundary air pollution through coordination is the Convention 
on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (“LRTAP”).122 
LRTAP entered into force in 1983123 and now binds forty-three 
states in Europe, Asia, and North America.124 LRTAP was 
initially conceived to combat air transport of sulphur dioxide 
(“SO2”),
125 which leads to acid rain, although the treaty’s provi-
sions were written broadly enough to encompass other pollut-
ants that can be conveyed through the air.126 In fact, it has been 
amended several times since entering into force to include other 
pollutants and has led to substantial reductions in the level of 
covered pollutants present in the atmosphere.127
LRTAP came about because Scandinavian states believed 
increased SO2 emissions were acidifying lakes in the region.
128 
Under LRTAP’s first incarnation, parties were required only 
to report their SO2 emissions.
129 Scientists at the European 
Monitoring and Evaluation Program (“EMEP”) then analyzed 
these reports, which resulted in the standardization of data col-
lection and reporting procedures across countries.130 After doing 
so, they were able to compare the emissions data to the rate of 
acidification of lakes and forests while taking into account wind 
patterns and concluded that acid rain was damaging forests 
and lakes, as the Scandinavians had suspected.131 The national 
reporting that LRTAP mandated and the EMEP data standardiza-
tion led to the coordination of national scientific efforts, which 
in turn led to the overall success of LRTAP.132
As the LRTAP example shows, cooperation can reduce 
transaction costs by creating standard reporting formats and 
uncertainties by generating information.133 LRTAP requires par-
ties to report, but the reports are not reviewed by any formal 
body; they are simply published with gaps and showings of 
noncompliance.134 Importantly, LRTAP did set targets on emis-
sions,135 but the reports are not used to single out violators.136 
They are instead used to “generate pressure for cooperative 
action to improve overall regime effectiveness.”137 As the suc-
cess of LRTAP shows, the importance of coordination cannot 
be exaggerated when trying to mitigate a problem as complex as 
transboundary air pollution.
Reporting and data collection often begin by member states 
self-reporting.138 This avoids the problems of infringing on state 
sovereignty and coercion.139 However, “the level of reporting 
[depends] on a variety of factors, most prominently the impor-
tance of the subject matter, the effectiveness of the secretariat or 
other central [MEA] institutions, and the capacity and resources 
of the reporting state.”140
Most MEAs rely on parties self-reporting.141 Secretariats 
often are required to verify the information, but many do not 
expend the resources or have the capacity to do so systemati-
cally.142 Verification of monitoring results is used to determine 
how effectively the problem is being dealt with, rather than to 
search for violators to punish.143 Once the center that records 
the data standardizes it, the data becomes easier to verify.144 
For example, the EMEP serves this function for LRTAP.145 
Assessment allows parties to learn how to improve performance 
by individual parties and the regime as a whole.146
It is very important that MEAs achieve high-quality reports 
because these reports provide information on a party’s compli-
ance and the effectiveness of the MEA. The nature and scope 
of the reporting requirements directly impact the quality of 
response.147 Reporting provisions can require that parties report 
on a number of topics, for example: measures taken to implement 
the MEA,148 success in meeting MEA obligations,149 proposed 
future policies and programs relevant to the MEA’s objectives,150 
and advance notification of activities that may cause transbound-
ary haze pollution.151 In this way, reporting can detect compli-
ance problems or the potential for compliance problems early 
on.152 Because environmental agreements often require highly 
scientific or technical reports, reporting can be particularly dif-
ficult for developing countries, which have greater constraints 
on their resources.153 One way to reduce the burden of reporting 
on developing countries is to provide a fund to help them buy 
monitoring equipment and train people to use it.154
Also embodied in the managerial model is the notion that 
effective regulation can result from cooperation not only between 
parties, but between an array of institutions, including private 
businesses and nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”).155 
This concept recognizes that legal systems do not operate as 
machines, but rather as “a kind of regulatory commons, where 
effective action is dependent upon alliances of groups overcom-
ing collective action barriers and pressuring administrators 
to respond.”156 Because NGOs have the ability to affect state 
behavior, they play a role in addressing the enforceability con-
cerns some have about MEAs.157
NGOs can assist in creating effective MEAs158 by collabo-
rating with governments to improve implementation of MEA 
obligations159 and raising awareness of activity that impacts the 
environment.160 They can provide independent information and 
data or verify data reported by the parties.161 NGOs can also 
bring pressure on noncompliant states in ways that a party to 
the MEA, which may have broader concerns about maintaining 
international relations, could not.162
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The managerial model enhances cooperation between par-
ties by focusing their attention on common goals to be achieved. 
This is in contrast to the traditional approach, with its focus on 
setting targets and then punishing parties when they do not reach 
those targets. This model in turn provides states with an effective 
framework for mitigating international environmental problems 
such as transboundary air pollution.
Iv. asean aGreemenT on Transboundary  
haze PolluTIon
The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution 
follows the managerial model and thus illustrates how MEAs 
that follow the managerial model can: (1) bring together par-
ties that are skeptical of binding agreements; and (2) enhance 
cooperation among parties in mitigating transboundary pollu-
tion. ASEAN adopted the Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution (“Agreement”) in June 2002.163 The Agreement 
entered into force on November 25, 2003, after ratification by 
six countries164 and places binding obligations on the parties to 
take steps to “prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution, 
which should be mitigated” in a way consistent with sustain-
able development.165 The current parties to the Agreement are 
Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, Brunei, Vietnam, Thailand, 
the Philippines, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.166 
Indonesia has signed but not ratified the Agreement.167
The origins of the Agreement trace back to the regional 
haze crisis of 1997.168 In that year, Southeast Asia faced an 
environmental catastrophe that led to “unprecedented health and 
financial damages” throughout the region.169 Fires in Indonesia 
from logging and palm plantations, especially on Sumatra and 
Kalimantan, raged, in part because of severe drought caused by 
El Niño conditions.170 When wind patterns shifted, the haze from 
the fires traveled from Indonesia to Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, 
Thailand, and the Philippines.171
Throughout the crisis, the U.S. National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration monitored the affected areas.172 
Schools and offices shut down, planes crashed, and people died 
from acute respiratory failure.173 By the time the fires were 
brought under control, the region had suffered widespread 
forest destruction, losing nearly ten million hectares.174 The 
fires destroyed portions of seventeen protected forest areas in 
Indonesia and land that could have otherwise been used for 
agriculture.175
The effects were not limited to the natural environment: 
millions of people in the region were exposed to the haze for 
weeks.176 The haze and its attendant harm were concentrated 
most heavily among Indonesians living on Sumatra and 
Kalimantan, the islands where the fires began.177 While the ulti-
mate cost of the fires and their haze is incalculable, estimates 
run into the billions, from US$ 4.5 billion to US$ 9.3 billion.178 
These figures include the destruction of farmland, both small-
scale and industrial timberland and the haze’s impact on “tour-
ism, foreign investment and additional health care costs.”179 In 
addition, the haze impacted long-term human health, biological 
diversity, farmland productivity, and atmospheric levels of 
greenhouse gases.180
A. ASEAN Norms
ASEAN has reinforced the principles of non-interference 
and national sovereignty in the region, a concept referred to as 
the “ASEAN way.”181 Because ASEAN member-states prefer to 
address issues in a “non-legal, consensual” manner,182 it is nota-
ble that every ASEAN member-state has signed the Agreement 
and, with the exception of Indonesia, ratified it.183
ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore through the Bangkok 
Declaration.184 Created to counteract the destabilizing effects 
of the Vietnam War on the region and restive separatist popu-
lations around border areas,185 ASEAN established goals to 
“promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters 
of common interest,” provide “training and research assistance,” 
“collaborate more effectively . . . , raise the living standard of 
their peoples,” and “maintain close and beneficial cooperation 
with existing regional and international organizations” in light 
of the recognition that the world is becoming “increasingly 
interdependent.”186
While the Bangkok Declaration’s emphasis on cooperation 
and working together might suggest member-states would cede 
authority to a central governing body, this has not been the case.187 
The region has seen relative stability during ASEAN’s forty-six 
year existence, and ASEAN member-states have successfully 
worked together to overcome external threats, while adher-
ing to the ASEAN norms. In keeping with the “ASEAN way,” 
ASEAN’s first response to the 1997 fire crisis was to develop 
the nonbinding Regional Haze Action Plan.188 The ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Haze endorsed the Plan in 1997,189 and in 
2002 the Plan was superseded by the Agreement.190
Building on ASEAN’s past environmental treaties,191 the 
Agreement places binding obligations on the parties to take 
steps to “prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution, 
which should be mitigated” in a way consistent with sustainable 
development.192 However, despite being referred to as “bind-
ing,” the provisions are written in a way that gives parties broad 
discretion over the extent and types of activities they will engage 
in to mitigate the transboundary pollution, consistent with the 
managerial model’s de-emphasis on specific, binding targets 
that parties must meet.193 Also in keeping with the managerial 
model,194 the Agreement expects parties to settle disputes about 
compliance through consultation or negotiation.195
In these respects, the Agreement is similar to LRTAP: 
they both impose few concrete obligations on the parties and 
are drafted to allow for interpretation. For instance, parties to 
the LRTAP were bound to “endeavor to limit and, as far as 
possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution including 
long-range transboundary air pollution.”196 Nearly every word 
in this provision gives parties power to interpret the obligations 
they are taking on—“endeavor,” “as far as possible,” and “gradu-
ally reduce” are all qualifiers typical of the managerial model’s 
focus on collaboration rather than coercion. These provisions 
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seem to impose few substantive requirements on parties, but 
that LRTAP has still managed to achieve substantial reductions 
in transboundary air pollution, suggests that the Agreement can 
also be successful and lead to the mitigation of transboundary 
haze pollution in Southeast Asia.197
The Agreement does place some 
binding obligations on parties, but 
most obligations are defined in gen-
eral, conditional terms. In all cases, 
parties must take “legislative, admin-
istrative and/or other measures to 
implement their obligations.”198 But 
rather than meet quantitative targets, 
parties must “undertake measures” 
to prevent and control activities that 
may lead to transboundary pollu-
tion.199 This conditional language 
does not concern itself with whether 
parties are complying with the Agreement at any point in time. 
Rather, it uses the managerial model, which recognizes that 
an MEA’s goals and paths to those goals will change as new 
information about the causes of transboundary pollution and the 
effects of parties’ mitigating actions come to light.200
According to the agreement, parties must: (1) “promote [a] 
zero burning policy . . . [e]nsuring that legislative, administrative 
and/or other relevant measures are taken to control open burning 
and to prevent land clearing using fire;” 201 (2) “[p]romot[e] and 
utiliz[e] indigenous knowledge and practices in fire prevention 
and management;” 202 (3) “strengthen local fire management 
and firefighting capability and co-ordination;”203 (4) “promot[e] 
public education and awareness-building campaigns and 
strengthen community participation in fire management;” 204 
(5) take appropriate measures to monitor all fire prone areas, 
all land and/or forest fires, environmental conditions conducive 
to such land and/or forest fires, and haze pollution arising from 
such land and/or forest fires;205 and (6) “promote and support 
scientific and technical research programmes related to the root 
causes and consequences of transboundary haze pollution.”206 
The parties’ more concrete obligations include: (1) “[i]dentify-
ing and monitoring areas prone to the occurrence of land and/or 
forest fires;”207 (2) designating a National Monitoring Centre;208 
(3) initiating immediate action to control or put out fires;209 
(4) designating Competent Authorities and a Focal Point, 
which will oversee the administration of the provisions of the 
Agreement;210 (5) preparing standard operating procedures for 
national action;211 and (6) being able to mobilize the resources 
needed to respond to and mitigate haze pollution.212
As is apparent from the Agreement’s language, many of 
the specific activities parties are required to undertake are con-
ditional. This choice reflects the fact that parties have limited 
resources to devote to the activities, and that because there are 
still gaps in information, it is not clear exactly what steps need 
to be taken. These gaps allow parties to experiment with differ-
ent approaches to the obligations and report their successes and 
failures.
B. Managerial Model Components of the Agreement
The Agreement relies on several structures to facilitate 
coordination and information reporting and sharing among par-
ties, each of which is consistent with the managerial model of 
MEAs.213 These structures are: (1) the ASEAN Coordinating 
Centre for Transboundary Haze 
Pollution Control, (2) the Secretariat, 
and (3) the Transboundary Haze 
Pollution Control Fund.214
The ASEAN Coordinating 
Centre for Transboundary Haze 
Pollution Control (“Centre”) pro-
motes transparency and coordina-
tion by gathering data, and then 
standardizing and releasing that data 
to parties much like the EMEP.215 
The Centre’s functions are an 
extension of ASEAN’s Specialised 
Meteorological Centre (“ASMC”), which was established in 
1993 to enhance collaboration between member-states’ national 
meteorological services.216 Since 2003, ASMC has worked in 
conjunction with the Centre by monitoring the ASEAN region 
for land and forest fires and transboundary haze.217 By perform-
ing these functions, the Centre and the ASMC are both collecting 
and generating information that will give parties more advance 
notice of conditions in which transboundary haze pollution may 
affect them.
The Centre also receives data compiled by parties’ national 
monitoring centres.218 Like the EMEP, the Centre “consolidate[s] 
and analyze[s] the data” so that it can assess environmental and 
human health risks each party faces from fires and consequential 
transboundary haze pollution.219 Having a centralized database 
allows for more efficient communication and thus decreases the 
time parties need to spend searching for this data. Rather than 
soliciting the other parties one by one when a party believes they 
have data suggesting transboundary haze is imminent, parties 
can obtain that data from the Centre.220 In addition to quicker 
access to the data, parties are able to understand the data better 
because the Centre standardizes reporting formats. This means 
parties will not have to spend time and resources trying to make 
sense of data that is reported. As the Centre becomes more 
sophisticated, it could even play a more proactive role by analyz-
ing the data and reporting it to parties.
Parties must also inform the Centre and other parties of the 
measures they have in place to implement the Agreement.221 By 
reporting on these steps, all parties are reassured that each is 
making a good faith effort to comply with the Agreement, which 
will reinforce the parties’ confidence in one another and lead to 
greater coordination.222 Moreover, reporting allows the Centre 
to analyze the relative effectiveness of each party’s measures and 
determine why some succeed and some do not. This role is par-
ticularly important in the case of “zero burning” policies because 
Agreement parties currently have little experience enforcing and 
explaining the benefits of these policies to communities where 
they remain the primary method of clearing land.223
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The ASEAN Secretariat plays an important role in imple-
menting the Agreement by facilitating coordination among the 
parties.224 To facilitate coordination, the Secretariat arranges 
meetings and disseminates information to parties.225 Above all, 
the Secretariat must arrange the Conference of the Parties to 
provide the parties an instance to evaluate the progress toward 
the Agreement’s goal of mitigating transboundary haze and the 
effectiveness of the methods used to reach that goal.226 Based on 
this evaluation, parties can decide to revise parties’ obligations 
or impose more concrete obligations in light of evolving scien-
tific understanding and the relative effectiveness of implementa-
tion measures.227
To assist parties in implementing the Agreement, the 
Agreement established the Transboundary Haze Pollution 
Control Fund (“Fund”).228 The Secretariat administers the Fund, 
which parties and other sources contribute to on a voluntary 
basis.229 For developing countries, a fund is essential for the suc-
cess of an environmental agreement, as some countries will not 
have the resources to set up monitoring stations and train per-
sonnel.230 Unfortunately, the parties have only contributed US$ 
240,329 to the Fund to date, 231 while the annual cost of dealing 
with transboundary haze may be as high as US$ 60 million.232 
However, the Agreement is silent on how to allocate the money 
in the Fund giving the Secretariat discretion to redirect spending 
to more effectively implement the Agreement in response to new 
information. 233
C. Other Coordination Provisions
The Agreement also contains two unique coordination pro-
visions. Parties must: (1) “[p]romote the development of mar-
kets for the utilization of biomass and appropriate methods for 
disposal of agricultural wastes;”234 and (2) “[f]acilitate mobilisa-
tion of appropriate resources within and outside the parties.”235
The “biomass” provision recognizes that peatlands, as 
biomass, are a large cause of the fires that create transbound-
ary haze.236 By developing markets for biomass, the Agreement 
incentivizes the harvest and controlled burning of peat by turn-
ing it into a product rather than a byproduct.237 The market also 
creates an incentive to manage peatlands more effectively so 
that the peat is not wasted. This provision, with its emphasis on 
reducing the chances of peatlands catching fire, is akin to the 
“zero burning” policies in that both protect peatlands vulnerable 
to fire.238
The “mobilisation of appropriate resources” provision is 
a feature of the Agreement that at first seems to conflict with 
ASEAN’s emphasis on sovereignty and noninterference. Under 
this provision, parties can request assistance from other states, 
including non-parties, and international organizations to help 
mitigate haze pollution within their territory.239 However, parties 
have almost total control over the requested assistance when it 
is in their territory. When a party declares an emergency, it can 
request that the Centre solicit assistance from other parties.240 
Parties then decide whether they will provide assistance and if 
so, what kind of assistance they will provide.241 If parties do 
provide assistance, the receiving party will facilitate entry to, 
departure from, and transit within its territory, and exempt the 
assisting party from taxes, and any other charges that would nor-
mally be assessed.242 In addition, the party receiving assistance 
will control all aspects of the assistance when it is in their ter-
ritory.243 Thus, states still retain their sovereignty and enjoy the 
benefit of greater resources.
With its conditional language, its establishment of struc-
tures that facilitate information gathering, and overarching 
goal of coordination between the parties, the Agreement is con-
sistent with the managerial model. Despite these features, the 
Agreement’s ultimate success depends on Indonesian ratification.
v. IndonesIan raTIFIcaTIon: a sTeP Toward 
mITIGaTInG Transboundary haze PolluTIon
Although the Agreement provides an effective framework 
for mitigating transboundary haze pollution, Indonesia has not 
ratified it.244 The ASEAN community and Indonesia’s president 
favor ratification, but Indonesia’s domestic politics have created 
a barrier to ratification.245 Even so, Indonesia has effectively 
been complying with the Agreement through its actions.246 
These actions have generated information and contributed to 
implementing the Agreement’s provisions, but they have taken 
place on an ad hoc basis that is inadequate to mitigate the trans-
boundary haze.247 Both the ASEAN community and Indonesia 
would benefit by Indonesia’s ratification of the Agreement.
A. Barriers to Ratification
Domestic politics can be a barrier to ratification, especially 
when a state is concerned that ratification will create expensive 
obligations.248 Once ratified, the state will likely be the primary 
enforcer of the MEA and the primary decision-maker on how 
to implement it to achieve compliance.249 However, because 
the Agreement follows the managerial model, Indonesia would 
have latitude in deciding what its terms mean and how to comply 
with the standards created.250 Despite international consensus 
that Indonesia should ratify the Agreement, its failure to do so 
reflects the difficulty of “navigat[ing] between what is achiev-
able internationally while constantly negotiating and using what 
is acceptable domestically.”251 At a recent meeting in Bangkok, 
the other ASEAN environmental members “urged Indonesia to 
ratify the [Agreement] as soon as possible.”252 While Indonesia 
has publicly stated it is prioritizing ratifying the Agreement,253 
ratification has been stalled by the legislature since 2008 when 
the legislature voted against ratification because it felt ASEAN 
was not doing enough to reduce the trade in timber illegally 
logged and exported from Indonesia.254
B. Advantages of Indonesian Ratification
Indonesian ratification would allow ASEAN to more effec-
tively deal with transboundary pollution. Indonesia is already 
taking action to mitigate transboundary haze, but Indonesia’s 
current ad hoc approach is not sufficient to address such a 
complex problem. The Agreement creates a framework that will 
allow Indonesia to perform the activities it is already engaged in 
more systematically. These activities bring Indonesia effectively 
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into compliance with the Agreement, and would form the basis 
for future efforts within the Agreement.
1. IndonesIA’s currenT AcTIons
Indonesia is also already taking action to mitigate trans-
boundary haze. Although not a party to it, Indonesia is effec-
tively complying with the Agreement. For instance, Indonesia 
recognizes the damage that fires from plantations and logging 
operations cause domestically and has taken steps to prevent 
this damage by passing a zero-burning policy and creating a 
fire brigade, each of which is an action required to comply with 
the Agreement.255 Further, Indonesia has committed to inter-
national efforts through the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering 
Committee on Transboundary Haze Pollution (“MSC”) and 
Indonesia’s Plan of Action, as well as efforts by an NGO, the 
Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil.
Indonesia is a member of the Sub-Regional Ministerial 
Steering Committee on Transboundary Haze Pollution formed 
in November 2006.256 Many of the MSC’s activities are similar 
or identical to the activities parties are required to take under the 
Agreement. For instance, the MSC has discussed sharing con-
cession maps that show where burning is taking place and hold-
ing those who are doing the burning responsible.257 Recently, the 
MSC agreed to share concession maps between governments.258 
The MSC has also agreed to establish a Technical Task Force 
whose role would be to monitor fires for MSC members.259
The MSC also discussed implementing the Strategic 
Review of MSC Programmes and Activities in 2012.260 The 
Strategic Review includes bringing on early warning systems, 
refining the Fire Danger Rating System, introducing training 
courses offered by the Regional Haze Training Network, and 
organizing an MSC Forum.261 Moreover, because the actions 
required under the MSC are similar to actions the parties to the 
Agreement take, the MSC is creating inefficiency by requiring 
parties to the Agreement to perform duplicate work. Indonesia, 
on the other hand, is already sharing information, monitoring 
fires, and evaluating programs it has in place, but none of this 
information is submitted to the Centre.262 Having this data in 
separate locations delays the standardization of the information, 
and by extension, coordination.
Indonesia also has a Plan of Action in Dealing with 
Transboundary Haze Pollution that creates obligations similar to 
the Agreement’s.263 This Plan involves educating people about 
zero burning techniques and developing and maintaining a 
firefighting force.264 The Plan is designed to educate local com-
munities about methods to prevent and mitigate forest and land 
fires.265 As part of the Plan, Indonesia has identified “[thirty-
five] fire-prone districts in [eight] provinces” that need special 
attention.266 The Plan has also invited ASEAN member states, 
all of whom are parties to the Agreement, to cooperate with one 
area in particular to build its capacity to deal with land and forest 
fires.267
As a part of the Plan, Indonesia has also cooperated bilater-
ally with Singapore to mitigate transboundary haze pollution268 
by reducing fires in the Jambi Province.269 The Jambi province is 
located on Southern Sumatra 270 and has 92 thousand hectares of 
palm oil plantations and 59 thousand hectares of rubber planta-
tions.271 Part of the region has peatland areas between fifty and 
eight hundred centimeters deep which are prone to catching fire 
due to the plantations’ use of slash-and-burn agriculture.272 As 
part of this coordination effort, Singapore set up air monitoring 
systems, trained Indonesians how to use them, and donated them 
to the Jambi province.273 While this coordination is a positive 
development and may improve conditions there, it could be more 
effective at mitigating transboundary haze overall if it took place 
within the Agreement because this effort could be more easily 
duplicated and improved upon if all parties were exposed to its 
development.
Some ASEAN members believe that sustainable palm 
oil production is one avenue to reducing regional haze as 
well as a way to increase palm oil farmers’ salaries.274 
Marketing a sustainably farmed product has become possible 
because consumers are becoming aware of the environmen-
tal effects of industrial agricultural practices taking place 
in Indonesia.275 The Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil 
(“Roundtable”), established by the World Wildlife Fund in 2001, 
has created a designation for palm oil products produced sus-
tainably.276 The Roundtable’s work thus creates an incentive for 
Indonesia to ratify the Agreement so that the country can take 
advantage of this label.
Taken together, these actions show that Indonesia is 
effectively complying with the conditional language of the 
Agreement. But because these actions are occurring through 
various unconnected arrangements, the lessons learned are not 
being exploited to their full potential.
2. rATIfIcATIon Would BrInG The BenefITs of The 
mAnAGerIAl model To The AGreemenT
Indonesia’s efforts to mitigate transboundary haze are 
important in their own right. But if it were to take these actions 
as a party to the Agreement, both Indonesia and other par-
ties would benefit from the consolidation of information and 
enhanced coordination. Indonesia itself would benefit from rati-
fying the Agreement through: (1) more systematic and sustained 
coordination, (2) access to the Fund, and (3) the ability to shape 
the content of the Agreement.
By ratifying the Agreement, Indonesia would benefit from 
greater coordination from the greater aggregation of informa-
tion, the standardization of that information, and greater assis-
tance from parties who are reassured by Indonesian ratification. 
Indonesia’s coordination with Singapore in addressing haze in 
Jambi province has provided information on how to mitigate 
transboundary haze pollution. The value of this information 
is limited if it is not shared with other parties. Moreover, if 
Indonesia’s coordination efforts are restricted to ad hoc arrange-
ments, it is more likely that the improvements in mitigating 
transboundary haze and the lessons learned from efforts such as 
the Jambi province effort will remain limited only to the goals of 
those arrangements. By reporting this information to the Centre 
as a party, however, the information is no longer standing alone; 
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it is now one piece used to solve the larger puzzle. Indonesia 
would also get the benefit of learning from other parties’ experi-
ences in implementing “zero burning” policies.
In addition, Indonesia would benefit from the Centre’s work 
on standardizing data. For each ad hoc arrangement to which 
Indonesia is a party, the resultant data could be communicated 
in a different format. Working within the Agreement, the Centre 
would standardize this information so that it is more meaningful 
for the country. Indonesian ratification would also lead to greater 
coordination because it will reassure parties that Indonesia takes 
the transboundary haze pollution seriously.277 As a result of this 
act, which is largely symbolic given Indonesia’s ongoing efforts, 
parties may be more willing to devote resources to the Fund.
Further, because the Secretariat’s only guidelines are to 
use the Fund to “implement” the Agreement, the entire Fund 
could very well be spent on implementation measures within 
Indonesia.278 Because the transboundary pollution is almost 
totally unidirectional,279 it would make sense for resources in the 
Fund to be spent on problems relating to the monitoring and pre-
vention of fires, problems which are largely in Indonesia.280 In 
this way the Fund could reduce the asymmetry of the costs and 
benefits that often accompany transboundary pollution, making 
ratification more attractive to Indonesia.281
Using the Fund to prevent and monitor fires (as opposed 
to haze) also has the advantage of 
reducing the amount of pollution that 
becomes transboundary pollution 
most effectively by addressing the 
pollution at its source.282 Admittedly, 
given the disparity between the Fund 
and the estimated cost of mitigating 
transboundary haze, a promise to 
allocate the Fund in this way may not 
create large benefits for Indonesia, 
at least initially. However, the Fund 
may grow if Indonesia ratifies the 
Agreement. Indonesian ratification 
would allow the Fund to be spent 
more efficiently. As the biggest 
source state, and thus the biggest 
contributor of transboundary haze 
pollution, it is most efficient to spend 
Fund resources in Indonesia.
Indonesia should also ratify the 
Agreement to be able to take a more 
active role in shaping the goals and 
implementation measures of the 
Agreement. If a state has an inter-
est in a framework MEA’s goals and 
the MEA is based on the managerial 
model, it may be in the state’s inter-
est to ratify the treaty. As a party to 
the MEA, that state has a role in reevaluating the MEA as new 
information on compliance, effectiveness, and the understand-
ing of the causes and effects of transboundary haze emerge.283 
Ultimately, discussions between the parties shape the MEA’s 
framework.284 Moreover, because of the importance of keeping 
source states in the MEA, affected states may be more willing to 
compromise, which gives Indonesia an advantage if it is at the 
table.285
If the Indonesian legislature is still concerned with the ille-
gal timber trade and its role in contributing to fires in Indonesia, 
it makes more sense to ratify the Agreement and then push for 
changes to protect Indonesian forests rather than to make pro-
tection a precondition for ratification. By becoming a member 
party, Indonesia would not only have more opportunities to share 
information and coordinate with other parties, it would also 
have a framework within which it could advocate for changes 
it thinks best mitigate transboundary haze pollution. The 
Agreement obligates parties to study the “root causes” of the 
haze, so Indonesia could begin compiling data on the effects that 
deforestation from illegal logging has on haze creation.286 This 
information could lead to an expansion of parties’ obligations 
under the Agreement’s “biomass” provision, which focuses on 
protecting degraded peatlands from catching fire but is silent 
on preventing the peatland degradation that leaves the peatlands 
vulnerable to fire in the first place.287 If Indonesia can persuade 
the other parties that the illegal timber trade results in a greater 
likelihood of peat fires, it may also be able to persuade other 
parties that an emphasis on legally 
sourced timber is one measure that 
can prevent peat fires. This could be 
accomplished through a variety of 
ways (e.g. strengthening domestic 
laws or devising a way to identify 
legally or sustainably sourced tim-
ber). But as the parties better under-
stand the issue and experiment with 
implementation measures to address 
it, they will become more effective at 
achieving this goal.
3. BenefITs for AseAn
ASEAN will also benefit from 
Indonesian ratification. Greater infor-
mation sharing by Indonesia will 
correct the data imbalance between 
source states and affected states, 
and Indonesia’s efforts to manage 
peatlands may prove useful to other 
countries as they industrialize.
Absent systematic sharing by 
Indonesia, the major source state, 
only affected states are submitting 
information to the Centre. This 
means the Centre is compiling and 
analyzing information about moni-
toring and preventing haze, which affects the source states, but 
not about fires, which occur in Indonesia, the major source 
state. One important exchange of information is the sharing of 
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concession maps,288 and data Indonesia has that cross-references 
hotspot289 locations to identify companies burning in those 
areas.290 By sharing these maps with the precise locations of 
plantations, affected states can perform more targeted monitor-
ing because they will better understand where the fires originate. 
This monitoring can then lead to a more complete understanding 
of how the haze pollution travels, allowing the Centre to develop 
information about preventing and managing fires.
While Indonesia may be the only source state at present, 
other states may become source states. ASEAN member-states 
are industrializing, and the region has thirty-five million hect-
ares of peatland.291 As pressure on the natural resources of other 
states increases, the likelihood of transboundary haze originating 
in these states also increases. Just as other states may become 
source states, Indonesia may become an affected state. Parties 
will be able to deal more effectively with these shifts in roles if 
there is information about monitoring and preventing haze and 
fires for them to draw on.
vI. conclusIon
The benefits of ratification to Indonesia and ASEAN should 
be enough to overcome the domestic hurdles to ratification. 
These benefits include greater coordination among the parties 
in addressing the transboundary haze originating in Indonesia by 
facilitating the spread of information and by allowing Indonesia 
to shape the Agreement based on its experiences as the only 
major source state in the region. These benefits are not limited 
to the current problem; they will also apply in the future when 
other states become source states.
Indonesia should ratify the Agreement because it creates an 
effective framework for mitigating transboundary haze pollution. 
By following the managerial model, the Agreement recognizes 
that complex problems like transboundary haze pollution are 
best addressed through systematic and sustained coordination 
between parties. While the Agreement may not eliminate the 
transboundary haze pollution immediately, it can bring all the 
stakeholders together to facilitate a more lasting solution than 
they would otherwise be able to reach on their own. 
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